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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the major peace agreements between the Government of the 
Philippines (GOP) and the Moros. The study addresses whether the Comprehensive 
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is likely to resolve the long-standing conflict 
between the GOP and the Moro separatist movements that date back to the 1960s. This 
study identifies why previous peace agreements between the GOP and rebel forces failed 
to achieve sustainable peace, and analyzes the extent to which the CAB addresses these 
failures. Specifically, this study compares the CAB to the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the 
1996 Final Peace Agreement, and the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral 
Domain. Though the CAB is still in the beginning stages of implementation, the effort by 
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This thesis will examine the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro 
(CAB) signed on March 27, 2014, by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the 
Government of the Philippines (GOP) against three other major peace agreements 
between the GOP and the Moros.1 This conflict between the Moros and the GOP 
emerged in response to a decades-long process of “territorial and demographic 
minoritization,”2 and has evolved through numerous failed negotiations into a quest by 
the Moros “for the right to self-determination and a form of governance that gives them 
dignity and power.”3 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will address if the CAB is likely to resolve the long-running conflict 
between the GOP and the Moro separatist movement that has thrived in Mindanao since 
the late 1960s. To answer this question, this thesis will identify the reasons that previous 
peace agreements between the government and rebel forces failed to resolve this conflict 
and assess the extent to which the new agreement addresses these reasons for their 
failure. More specifically, this thesis will compare the CAB to the 1976 Tripoli 
Agreement, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, and the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement 
on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). 
 
 
1 The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro, Republic of the Philippines, last modified 
March 27, 2014, http://www.gov.ph/2014/03/27/document-cab/. 
2 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Neither Sovereignty nor Autonomy: Continuing Conflict in the Southern 
Philippines,” in Proceedings of the 102nd Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) Vol. 
102, (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 2008), 122, 
http://www/jstor.org/stable/25660279. 
3 Ibid., 123. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the 1960s, the Moros have engaged in a series of military campaigns to 
achieve their goals. As a result of these conflicts, more than 100,000 people have died, 
and, at various times, millions more have been displaced from their homes.4 On four 
occasions, the GOP has negotiated peace agreements with Moro separatist organizations. 
However, the first three failed to bring peace to Mindanao. As a result, the government 
has continued to face an armed opposition movement that counts more than 10,000 
fighters and controls large amounts of territory.5 Over the past 15 years, Philippine and 
international terrorist groups have taken advantage of this conflict to obtain safe havens, 
train, and launch attacks. Moreover, the magnitude and persistence of violence in the 
Southern Philippines has led the Philippine military to devote the bulk of its resources to 
internal security, and encouraged the GOP to invest in a force structure that is poorly 
prepared to meet external threats, such as the ones they face in the South China Sea. 
Thus, the success or failure of the recent peace agreement is important not just for the 
livelihood of the Moros, but also for the GOP’s ability to refocus its resources on 
pressing external security challenges. 
For the purpose of producing a consistent naming convention within this thesis, 
“separatist groups” will be referred to as the “Moros,” unless the text is specifically 
referring to a certain separatist group. All separatist groups in this study originate from 
Mindanao. When something applies to all separatist groups, rather than listing each 
individual group, they will be collectively referred to as the name that the people of 
Mindanao were given in order to prevent confusion. The area of research in the Southern 
Philippines will be referred to as “Mindanao,” unless the research is specifically referring 
to an island in the Sulu archipelago. Mindanao is one of the three major archipelagos that 
make up the Philippines. To prevent confusion, the area of research will be referred to as 
the name of the island group that it belongs to, rather than referring to each individual 
province on Mindanao. 
4 Tuminez, Neither Sovereignty nor Autonomy, 122. 
5 BBC News Asia, “Guide to the Philippines Conflict,” BBC News, October 8, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17038024. 
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Determining whether or not the CAB will succeed where previous agreements 
failed offers a significant point in the realm of group conflict. This thesis will assess 
whether the conditions granted in the CAB will likely resolve the Moro and the GOP 
conflict that dates back to the 1960s.6 If the CAB can deliver conditions that satisfy all 
parties involved, then Mindanao may finally find closure to an armed conflict that has 
been responsible for population displacement of over a million Moros and the deaths of 
over 100,000 Moros.7 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Postcolonial states in…Southeast Asia continue to be challenged by violent 
ethnonationalist and secessionist insurgencies,” states Rajat Ganguly in an introduction 
on resolving ethnonational conflict through autonomy.8 These insurgencies looked for the 
creation of “artificial and arbitrary state boundaries” with “the real ethnic divisions on the 
ground.”9 Historically, state governments would ignore these calls for reorganization in 
an effort to maintain state stability.10 States feared that territorial reorganization of any 
type would display institutional weakness and bring the return of their former 
colonizers.11 The state’s opposition to these demands brought forth the creation of 
“ethnonationalist and secessionist movements.”12 
On managing such conflicts, Stefan Wolff provides subject matter expert Ted 
Gurr’s thoughts on autonomy; Wolff states that “autonomy arrangements can be an 
6 Tuminez, “Neither Sovereignty nor Autonomy,” 122. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Rajat Ganguly, “Is Autonomy a Solution or an Obstacle to Resolving Ethno-National Conflicts,” in 
Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Rajat Ganguly (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 1. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Michelle Ann Miller, “The Problem of Armed Separatism: Is Autonomy the Answer?” in Autonomy 
and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Michelle Ann Miller (Singapore: Institute for 
Southeast Asia, 2012), 3. 
12 Ganguly, “Is Autonomy a Solution,” 1. 
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effective means for managing regional conflict.”13 Based on this understanding, the CAB 
could resolve the conflict in Mindanao depending on autonomous conditions granted 
within the peace agreement. Michelle Ann Miller defines autonomy as “a core set of 
characteristics” with “two features that all autonomy arrangements have in common.”14 
The first feature names specific boundaries within the state and without harm to the 
state’s territorial integrity. The second feature deals with the devolution of authority. This 
downward distribution can cover a negotiated arrangement of power dealing with 
“legislative, political, administrative, economic, cultural, and religious affairs from the 
central government to the minority peoples or region that comprise the autonomous 
entity.”15  
On autonomy, Marc Weller adds that the autonomy granted should “be tailored 
specifically to the particular circumstances of the situation in question.”16 For this thesis, 
these circumstances will be derived from demands of the Mindanao conflict between the 
Moros and the GOP. These “particular circumstances” will be key when predicting the 
CAB’s ability to resolve conflict in Mindanao.17 This thesis asks whether the autonomy 
granted, as defined by Miller and Weller, is likely to resolve the longstanding conflict. 
1. Reasons Autonomy May Resolve Conflict 
Autonomy has been credited as one of many different approaches in resolving 
ethnonational conflict. On autonomy, David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild assert that 
“political decentralization along territorial lines” has begun to play an increasing role in 
the structuring of “contemporary civil war settlements.”18 Solutions that encompass this 
13 Stefan Wolff, “Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Merils and Perils of Territorial Accommodation,” 
Political Studies Review 9, no. 1 (January 2011): 27, doi:10.1111/j.1478-9302.2010.00224.x. 
14 Miller, “Problem of Armed Separatism,” 6. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Marc Weller, Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, ed. Marc Weller and 
Katherine Nobbs (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 1. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil 
Wars, ed. Philip G. Roeder and Donald Rothchild (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 109. 
 4 
                                                 
autonomous theme have been utilized in GOP attempts to end civil war in Mindanao.19 
This is often the chosen route because it recognizes “the political and spatial realities on 
the ground” and “the division of territory won…at the negotiating table.”20 Along the 
same lines, Dawn Brancati adds that there is a belief that “political decentralization” may 
decrease “ethnic conflict and secessionism in the world today.”21 
By creating autonomous conditions that suit all parties, we may expect that 
decentralization provides the Moros with “greater autonomy over cultural, economic, and 
social policies,” and the GOP with the satisfaction of “territorial integrity.”22 If 
decentralization is ignored and the agreement gravitates towards “political 
centralization,” Lake and Rothchild provide that finding stability in conflict becomes 
more difficult.23 Brancati strengthens Lake and Rothchild’s claim with “statistical 
analysis” that states “decentralized systems of government are less likely to 
experience...conflict and...rebellion than centralized systems of government.”24 If the 
CAB can create decentralization that can “reduce...conflict and secessionism,” we can 
expect the empowerment of “ethnic groups clustered in regions to pass legislation 
protecting their various interests and concerns” in Mindanao.25 If the peace settlement 
can establish such guidelines, then we can expect that the CAB may resolve conflict in 
Mindanao. 
Furthermore, Jacques Bertrand says that there is a scholarly consensus “that 
autonomy…can reduce ethnic conflict, alleviate nationalist demands, and prevent 
secession.”26 In doing so, autonomous conditions provide “the means to obtain cultural 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Dawn Brancati, “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict 
and Secessionism,” International Organization 60, no. 3 (July 2006): 651, 
doi:10.1017/S002081830606019X. 
22 Roeder and Rothchild, Sustainable Peace, 120. 
23 Ibid., 132. 
24 Brancati, “Decentralization,” 681. 
25 Ibid., 655–6. 
26 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
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recognition, certain guarantees, laws, or advantages for itself.”27 In closing, if the CAB 
satisfies the demands of all parties, autonomous conditions that distribute powers can 
facilitate the Moros’ management of policies at the regional level.28 An agreement that 
grants such autonomy will potentially resolve the long-running conflict in Mindanao. 
2. Reasons Autonomy May Not Resolve Conflict 
While some see autonomy as a key factor in reaching resolution, others believe 
that it exacerbates the problem. Brancati states that some scholars believe that it worsens 
the conflict “by reinforcing regionally based ethnic identities” and provides “groups at 
the regional level of government with the resources to engage in ethnic conflict and 
secessionism.”29 Based on this understanding, autonomy strongly reinforces separatist 
beliefs. By awarding autonomy to the minority group, the government consequently 
provides the necessary tools and resources needed to challenge the state for their 
sovereignty.30 One opinion states that autonomy could potentially increase conflict.31 
With more power than the minority group started with in its quest for autonomy, it is easy 
to understand how success in their struggle and this newly awarded autonomy can 
regenerate separatist feelings. 
Another perspective explains that just because autonomy mandates “new 
institutional arrangements,” does not mean “quality of governance would automatically 
improve.”32 Numerous case studies show that a decrease in quality is what typically 
occurs.33 As a result, once these new arrangements have been implemented, it takes time 
before the new system can take effect. Some believe that autonomy fails due to continuity 
of poor governing from one administration to the next.34 Such failure is typically coupled 
27 Ibid., 186. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Brancati, “Decentralization,” 652. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ganguly, “Is Autonomy a Solution,” 4. 
32 Ibid., 5. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 4. 
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with the outgoing and incoming government’s inability to properly implement conditions 
of the agreement.35  
Last, some believe that autonomy will fail if the associated conditions are 
exclusive. The Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) news agency of the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs quotes a past 
“United Nation (UN) report evaluating progress in building lasting peace in countries 
emerging from conflict since 2010,” stating that exclusion of groups would act as a 
catalyst to the re-ignition of violence in the region.36 The same report reveals that a 
majority of all-inclusive agreements have achieved conflict resolution.37  
This study believes that inclusivity and full implementation of the agreement are 
the key factors to achieving sustainable peace in Mindanao. Marc Weller states that for 
autonomy to succeed, agreements should “be tailored specifically to the particular 
circumstances of the situation in question.”38 In this case, all groups negotiating must be 
satisfied with the conditions designed. Weller adds that conditions must also be created in 
a way where “central authorities will not…change the overall constitutional makeup of 
the state in order to accommodate separatist pressure.”39 If satisfaction can be achieved 
with a well-designed agreement, full implementation of such an agreement may likely 
resolve conflict. Additionally, Clare Castillejo states that there is proof of inclusivity’s 
role in ending conflict.40 She adds that this proof supports that “the inclusion of excluded 
groups in post-conflict political settlements is important to ensure a sustainable exit from 
35 Ibid. 
36 “Prospects For Peace In Mindanao,” Integrated Regional Information Networks: Humanitarian 
News and Analysis, March 19, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/99806/prospects-for-peace-in-
mindanao. 
37 Integrated Regional Information Networks, Prospects For Peace. 
38 Marc Weller, Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts, ed. Marc Weller and 
Katherine Nobbs (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 1. 
39 Ibid., 1. 
40 Clare Castillejo, “Promoting Inclusion in Political Settlements: A Priority for International Actors,” 




                                                 
conflict.”41 Agreements that apply both points into its final design have a better chance of 
achieving sustainable peace. 
3. Ethnonational Character of the Moro Separatist Movements 
The Moros, as labeled by the Spanish (due to a resemblance with their Moroccan 
and Mauritanian adversaries), were not strangers to ethnic conflict.42 The Moros were 
once involved in a deep conflict that stretched back to the Spanish colonial era.43 The 
conflict was a struggle involving Spanish invaders encroaching on their homeland, 
attempting to cleanse the Moros of their Muslim identity, and forcing integration into the 
Christian faith.44 Today, the Moros account for five percent of the Philippine’s 
population of 107 million, and the majority of the Moros reside in Mindanao.45 The 
Moros’ claim to the Southern Philippines traces back centuries before the Spanish arrival 
in 1565.46  
Appropriately, the Moros have evolved into a ethnic nation during the course of 
this longstanding ethnonational conflict. Ganguly defines ethnic nation as a population 
that resides within a “defined territorial homeland” and shares a common cultural 
heritage, language, history, and sometimes religion, with the will “to exist as an 
independent and sovereign nation-state.”47 Therefore, ethnonational conflict, as defined 
by Wolff, provides that at least one group involved in conflict perceives that 
41 Ibid. 
42 Benedicto R. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks,” United States Institute Of Peace, July 23, 2014, 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr131.pdf. 
43 G. Eugene Martin and Astrid S. Tuminez, “Toward Peace in the Philippines,” United States Institute 
Of Peace, July 23, 2014, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr202.pdf. 
44 Ibid., 1. 
45 The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, last modified June 20, 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html; Bacani, Mindanao Peace Talks, 
3. 
46 Bacani, Mindanao Peace Talks, 3. 
47 Ganguly, Is Autonomy a Solution, 2. 
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discrimination is occurring due to ethnonational differences.48 This defines the Moros’ 
stand against the GOP in their quest for autonomy. 
4. Moro Demands for Autonomy 
Similar to the Moros of the colonial period, the Moros in contemporary times 
have been heavily involved in armed conflict against the GOP. The Muslims, who were 
subjugated to Spanish colonization, also endured “poor governance and lack of justice” 
from the GOP for over forty years.49 The Moros, who were left out of development, 
answered rebelliously with action by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the 
late 1960s.50 This was the beginning of armed conflict with the MNLF, and eventually 
the MILF—a breakaway group from the MNLF—and other splinter groups that heavily 
contributed to the deaths of over 100,000 people.51 Since the MNLF’s inception, there 
have been numerous failed attempts at resolution between the MNLF, MILF, and GOP. 
As a result, there has been a gradual downgrade of the Moros “from Philippine society, 
politics, and economic development.”52 Consequently, Mindanao has suffered from the 
steady decline in autonomy. This thesis focuses on the 1976 Tripoli Agreement with the 
MNLF, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF, and the 2008 Memorandum of 
Agreement on Ancestral Domain with the MILF to understand the various negotiated 
demands and reasons for failure. 
5. Latest Effort to Negotiate Resolution 
On March 27, 2014, the conflict arrived at an agreement after more than forty 
years of fighting with the signing of the CAB between the MILF and the GOP.53 After 
years of failed attempts, the GOP and the MILF stated that this agreement adequately 
48 Stefan Wolff, “Managing Ethno-National Conflict: Towards an Analytical Framework, 
StephanWolff.com, accessed September 7, 2014, http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/Managing%20Ethno-
national%20Conflict%20(draft).pdf. 
49 Martin and Tuminez, Toward Peace, 1. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Tuminez, Neither Sovereignty Nor Autonomy, 122. 
52 Martin and Tuminez, Toward Peace, 1. 
53 Republic of the Philippines, The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. 
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addresses Moro demands and reasons of past failure. On June 26, 2014 the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted the Third Istanbul Conference on Mediation, to 
discuss details of the peace process in Southern Mindanao.54 Selcuk Colakoglu of The 
Journal of Turkish Weekly provides that panelists consisting of scholars and government 
officials stated that the process of achieving peace in Southern Mindanao was a 
success.55 Colakoglu adds that “political, security-related, and socio-economic measures 
are being formulated” and that “authorities believe...all practical deficiencies will be 
remedied.”56 As a result, Colakoglu affirms that the success achieved by the level of 
autonomy granted provides the global community with a “success story” that can be used 
to motivate other states “to overcome similar conflicts through dialogue and 
negotiation.”57  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis will discuss two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is if there is an 
exclusion of certain groups from the planning process, the latest peace agreement is 
unlikely to resolve the conflict in Mindanao. The second hypothesis is that without full 
implementation of the agreed-upon conditions by all groups involved, it is unlikely that 
the latest peace agreement will resolve conflict in Mindanao. 
The newly signed CAB appears promising; however, observers like the Integrated 
Regional Information Networks (IRIN) news agency, Paula Defensor Knack, Edsel 
Tupaz, and Daniel Wagner claim that the agreement will not serve as a peaceful solution 
to the conflict. These observers have stated that exclusion of groups from the agreement 
will prolong the conflict. The IRIN news agency of the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provides that the recently signed agreement with 
the MILF fails to include separatist groups such as the MNLF, the Bangsamoro Islamic 
Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and “the Al Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf and Khalifa Islmiyah 
54 Selcuk Colakoglu, “Can the Mindanao Peace Process End with a Success Story?,” Journal of 
Turkish Weekly, July 2, 2014, http://www.turkishweekly.net/print.asp?type=4&id=3892. 




                                                 
Mindanao.”58 The news agency also states that, to external observers, participation of 
Mindanao’s indigenous peoples, the Lumads, in the negotiations is vague.59 Thoughts of 
Paula Defensor Knack are in line with IRIN’s claim. Knack also believes that exclusion 
of the “MNLF, private armies…paramilitary civilian groups… militias… the heirs of the 
Sultanate of Sulu…and the indigenous tribes” is an issue with the newly signed 
agreement.60 Edsel Tupaz and Daniel Wagner of International Policy Digest have 
labeled the exclusiveness of the CAB as “the primary issue.”61 Based on the statements 
made by IRIN, Knack, Tupaz, and Wagner, sustainable peace is not expected and 
exclusion of these other groups may hinder the GOP and MILF from achieving 
sustainable peace. 
Others believe that failure to implement conditions of the agreement will hurt the 
chances for peace. Historically, peace agreements often fail during implementation of the 
deal.62 The difficulty is not in reaching an agreement, but rather executing what was 
agreed upon.63 Even if conditions agreed upon satisfy all parties, there is still potential 
for failure in achieving sustainable peace during the implementation phase. Associate 
Research Fellow, Joseph Franco from the Center of Excellence for National Security 
(CENS) of the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang 
Technological University, Singapore, argues that “small arms proliferation and a weak 
rule of law” will hurt the chances of resolving conflict in Mindanao.64 Franco 
pessimistically claims that execution of the MILF disarmament will be extremely 
58 Integrated Regional Information Networks, Prospects For Peace. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Paula Defensor Knack, “Bangsamoro Peace Deal For Mindanao: Where’s the Peace?,” The 
Diplomat, April 9, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/bangsamoro-peace-deal-for-mindanao-wheres-
the-peace/. 
61 Edsel Tupaz and Daniel Wagner, “Can the Peace Dividend Last in the Philippines?,” International 
Policy Digest, March 31, 2014, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/03/31/can-peace-dividend-
last-philippines/. 
62 Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
63 Ibid., 7. 
64 Joseph Franco, “Violence and Peace Spoilers in the Southern Philippines,” Middle East Institute, 
July 15, 2014, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/violence-and-peace-spoilers-southern-philippines. 
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difficult in a region where there is “an entrenched gun culture.”65 He states that in a 
region where there are over “100,000 guns ... and where weapons are passed on as family 
heirlooms” achieving disarmament could be difficult.66 Knack of The Diplomat would 
concur with Franco in terms of the difficulty to achieve complete disarmament; however, 
she believes that “total disarmament” is an issue because “four commanders of the MILF, 
with about 4,000 followers have refused to accept that requirement and returned to the 
MNLF fold, vowing to resume their secession bid.”67  Without full disarmament, full 
implementation may not be possible.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A comparative study of past failed agreements with the MNLF and the MILF 
against the recently signed CAB with the MILF are conducted in order to assess the 
agreement’s ability to resolve the long-running conflict between the GOP and the Moros. 
This analysis provides the historical background of each failed agreement discussed, what 
was agreed upon, and assessments on each agreement’s reasons of failure. Information 
and assessments analyzed by this thesis combine scholarly research, think-tank 
assessments, and news-media articles. Information is analyzed to ask why the 
longstanding conflict has not been resolved. Assessments are conducted on the 1976 
Tripoli Agreement with the MNLF, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF, 
and the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain with the MILF. These 
case studies have been specifically selected, since failure of each agreement has played a 
significant role in extending the life of the Mindanao conflict. 
Following the assessments of each failed agreement with the MNLF and MILF, 
this thesis examines the CAB. The analysis of this agreement provides the main points 
agreed upon between the GOP and the MILF. Further assessment discusses if the 
conditions granted in the CAB satisfyingly address the demands and reasons of past 
failures and its ability to resolve the long-running conflict in Mindanao. Since the 
65 Ibid. 
66 Franco, Violence and Peace Spoilers. 
67 Knack, Bangsamoro Peace Deal. 
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agreement is considerably new, scholarly assessments are limited. This thesis references 
an assortment of secondary sources that predict if the conflict will be resolved. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis asks if the CAB can resolve the longstanding conflict. Full cooperation 
between the GOP and the MILF during implementation of the agreement may be required 
in order to fully resolve the conflict.  
Chapter II discusses the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the GOP and the 
MNLF. It conducts a historical background review of the agreement, reviews the 
negotiation process, discusses its implementation, and analyzes why the agreement failed. 
Chapter III discusses the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GOP and the 
MNLF. It conducts a historical background review of the agreement, reviews the 
negotiation process, discusses its implementation, and analyzes why the agreement failed. 
Chapter IV discusses the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MOA-AD) between the GOP and the MILF. It conducts a historical background review 
of the agreement, reviews the negotiation process, discusses its implementation, and 
analyzes why the agreement failed. 
Chapter V discusses the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) 
between the GOP and the MILF. It conducts a historical review of events leading to the 
signing of the agreement in March of 2014, reviews the negotiation process, discusses its 
implementation, and lists reasons why the agreement might fail or succeed.  
This study concludes with a comparison of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between 
the GOP and the MNLF, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GOP and the 
MNLF, and the 2008 MOA-AD between the GOP and the MILF against the CAB. 
Additionally, this conclusion will take the most important points of failure from each 
previous agreement to ask whether each point of failure applies to the current situation 
and if it has been addressed in the CAB. Based on the results from the comparison 
conducted, this thesis attempts to predict whether the CAB will resolve the longstanding 
conflict in Mindanao. 
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II. 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT 
After World War II, the region experienced government sponsored influxes of 
Christian settlers; policies that encouraged the movement of Christian Filipinos into the 
south continued to be heavily enforced during the dictatorship of President Ferdinand 
Marcos.68 Christian elites, with support from the Philippine military formed 
organizations in the late 1960s that began taking ownership of lands belonging to the 
Moros.69 The “land grabbing” left many Moro Muslims with nowhere to go.70 In 
response, the Moro elites and landowners joined forces to fight against the Christian 
‘invaders’.71  
Policies that supported Christian movement into the south proved effective with 
population control in the north; however, they increased tensions in Mindanao that gave 
birth to southern separatist movements.72 Conflicts between the Muslims and Christians 
continued to increase longstanding and violent war between the separatist groups of 
Mindanao and the Government of the Philippines (GOP).73 Fights progressed past land 
issues and extended into battles for the region’s top government positions.74 Control of 
the government by either entity guaranteed protection of each group’s political and 
economic priorities. While the death toll increased, the Christians emerged victorious in 
government elections for some of the top positions in the region. Unresolved land issues 
and transitions in authority increased problems between the Moro Muslims and the GOP. 
President Marcos used this conflict as justification to support his declaration of Martial 
Law.75 His decision to declare Martial Law was perceived as “another move...to deprive 
68 Ashgar Ali Engineer, “Struggle For A Separate Islamic State,” Economic and Political Weekly 19, 
no. 51/52 (1984), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4373905. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Engineer, Struggle For A Separate Islamic State, 2154. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, “ARMM History,” Official website 
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, accessed February 1, 2015, http://armm.gov.ph/history/. 
73 Martin and Tuminez, Toward Peace in the Philippines, 2–3. 
74 Engineer, Struggle For A Separate Islamic State, 2154. 
75 Ibid., 2155. 
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Muslim traditional leadership of its power and influence.”76 As a result, 1971 saw the 
birth of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).77 Its founder, Nur Misuari, led the 
Moro Muslims in a fight for autonomy against the GOP. Members of the MNLF were 
very proud of their Moro heritage and aimed to restore equality for the Moros in 
Mindanao.78 Their ideology and the arrival of martial law would result in a violent 
response towards the GOP.79  
Nur Misuari’s insurgency represented Mindanao in its quest for autonomy. The 
MNLF’s creation was the physical form of “Moro opposition” to “mass Christian 
migration to the south” and to economic practices that the Moros were subjected to once 
“the local Christian sector increasingly gained control of the local economic 
infrastructure.”80 Most importantly, in this attempt to regain control of the land that was 
once Moro dominated, the MNLF led the fight to recapture “Muslim political power” 
from the Christian transplants.81 The government policy responsible for the relocation of 
Christians into Mindanao marginalized the Moro majority into an ethnic minority and left 
many of them homeless.82 The Moros, once rich in “mineral wealth” and blessed with an 
abundance of “natural resources,” now found themselves with extreme financial 
difficulties and living “in grinding poverty.”83 
The fight originally directed towards the migrating Christians eventually targeted 
the GOP; the GOP led by President Ferdinand Marcos had been accused of favoring the 
Christians during the conflict between the two groups.84 President Marcos responded 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 2154. 
78 Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern 
Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002). 
79 Yegar, Between Integration, 268. 
80 Ivan Molloy, “The Question of an Alliance Between Islam and Communism,” Asian Survey 25, no. 
8 (1985), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644112. 
81 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 824. 
82 Ashgar Ali Engineer, “The Moro Struggle Seen in a Wider Perspective,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 20, no. 48 (1985), http://www.jstor.org/stable/4375053. 
83 Engineer, The Moro Struggle, 2113. 
84 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 825. 
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with approaches that increased “economic exploitation and political repression” of the 
Moros.85 It appeared to the Moros that the GOP was “trying to drive a wedge between 
the Christians and Muslims.”86 The conflict influenced President Marcos’ decision to 
impose Martial Law on the Philippines in 1972 due to concerns of a “communist 
insurgency movement intent on capturing state power and a Muslim secessionist 
movement” in Mindanao.87 As a result, the MNLF declared war against President 
Marcos and his administration.88 The MNLF’s declaration included the activation of the 
Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), who would be responsible for fighting GOP forces and 
defending the Moro residents of Mindanao.89 War and the inability to regain political 
control further justified their necessity to break away from the Philippines and “form an 
independent Islamic homeland, the Bangsa Moro Republic.”90 
Nur Misuari of the MNLF found some support in their struggle for independence 
from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).91 OIC backing came in the form of 
“moral and material support.”92 OIC member Libya reiterated its support for the MNLF 
during the MNLF leader’s visit to their country; from the announcement of Martial Law 
in 1972, the OIC continuously monitored Muslim struggle in Mindanao. Acting as an 
MNLF advocate, the OIC communicated the necessity of establishing peace with the 
MNLF.93  
85 Ibid. 
86 Engineer, The Moro Struggle, 2114. 
87 Cesar Adib Majul, “The Moro Struggle in the Philippines,” Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1988), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable3992672. 
88 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 825. 
89 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 906. 
90 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 825. 
91 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 907. 
92 Ronald J. May, “From Obstacles to Conflict Resolution in the Southern Philippines,” in Autonomy 
and Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Michelle Ann Miller (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 280. 
93 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 907. 
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A. NEGOTIATION OF PEACE AGREEMENT 
The negotiations that produced the 1976 Tripoli Agreement were mediated by the 
OIC and occurred in two stages. In the first round, both groups met in Saudi Arabia, but 
arrived at a stalemate. In the second round, both groups met in Libya and concluded the 
meeting with the creation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. 
From 1972 to 1974, the GOP and Moro conflict was always a topic of discussion 
at the annual OIC conferences; after years of aggressive OIC pressure to remedy the 
conflict, the GOP recognized that they would need OIC support to achieve resolution 
with the Moros.94 Finally, in 1975, the GOP sent representatives for a meeting with the 
MNLF in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The panels discussed MNLF demands of “a 
constitutional amendment guaranteeing autonomy for the five islands of Mindanao, 
Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Palawan, which would be administered as a single unit.”95 
The GOP delegation responded that they did not possess the authority to approve such 
demands. The MNLF responded with a declination to the GOP’s requests of a “ceasefire” 
and an MNLF review of GOP “economic programs for Muslims.”96 Inability to 
compromise and resolve these issues led to a halt in the discussion and more fighting.97 
This meeting made no progress in searching for a peaceful solution to the conflict. Both 
parties departed with an understanding that they would attempt negotiation at a later 
time.98 
After the talks ended, the OIC continued to monitor the conflict between the 
MNLF and GOP. The conflict was responsible for the death of thousands and the 
displacement of millions.99 The OIC eventually threatened the Philippines with an “oil 
embargo” if they refused to peacefully resolve the conflict with the MNLF in 1976.100 
94 Ibid. 
95 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 907. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., 908. 
98 Ibid., 907. 
99 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 825. 
100 Ibid. 
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The Philippines had already experienced the effects of an oil embargo emplaced on them 
during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.101 During this conflict, some Arab nations announced 
an embargo that would significantly decrease oil production and restrict trade with 
countries that supported Israel.102 The Philippines was eventually removed from the list 
of restricted countries.103 However, the Philippines now clearly understood the 
detrimental impact of an Arab oil embargo on their country. In fear that another oil 
embargo would occur, the Philippines carefully reconsidered negotiations towards a 
sustainable peace. As a result, President Marcos agreed to a “ceasefire” and to meet with 
the MNLF to begin negotiations for a peace agreement.104  
Deliberations over what autonomous conditions would be granted to the Moros in 
Mindanao occurred at the close of 1976.105 The meeting came shortly after the GOP’s 
development of “programs to improve the economic level of Muslims, housing projects 
for refugees, guarantees of religious freedom for Muslims, the return of a few hundred 
ex-rebels, more scholarships for young Muslims, an increase in Muslim appointees to 
civil office, and a marked reduction in hostilities” in Mindanao.106 
Philippine representative Imelda Marcos traveled to Libya to coordinate a 
delegation to meet with the MNLF. Discussions over what became the Tripoli Agreement 
took place between the GOP and the MNLF. President Mohamar Qadaffi of Libya 
mediated the OIC endorsed meeting held at Tripoli.107 First Lady of the Philippines, 
101 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, “From The Pitfalls of Working for Peace in a Time of Political Decay,” in 
Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict in South and South East Asia, ed. Rajat Ganguly (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 116. 
102 A. F. Alhajji, “The Oil Weapon: Past, Present, and Future,” Oil & Gas Journal, May 2, 2005, 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-103/issue-17/general-interest/the-oil-weapon-past-present-and-
future.html. 
103 Robert Mabro, “The Oil Weapon: Can It Be Used Today,” Harvard National Review 29, no. 3 
(2007): 57, http://hir.harvard.edu/archives/1659. 
104 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 825. 
105 Engineer, The Moro Struggle, 2114. 
106 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 908. 
107 Steven Rood, “From Interlocking Autonomy: Manila and Muslim Mindanao,” in Autonomy and 
Armed Separatism in South and Southeast Asia, ed. Michelle Ann Miller (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2012), 262. 
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Imelda Marcos, was appointed as the official representative of the GOP to lead peace 
negotiations with Nur Misuari’s MNLF.108 
The negotiations in 1976 between both parties initially brought forth an MNLF 
demand of autonomy for 25 provinces.109 The OIC managed to reduce the requested 
number down to 13 provinces.110 The final draft of the settlement ended with an 
agreement to grant the Moros autonomous control of “the 13 Philippine provinces of 
historical Muslim influence.”111 The conditions would also end armed attacks from both 
ends. Finally, after years of conflict and extensive negotiations in Libya, the Tripoli 
Agreement was signed on 23 December 1976. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
The Tripoli Agreement was never completely implemented, primarily because the 
Philippine government took steps that neither side had agreed to and which the MNLF 
vehemently opposed. The original conditions that both groups agreed to were subjected 
to a plebiscite. The results strongly deviated from the original conditions produced and 
what the MNLF expected. The events following the plebiscite referendum signaled its 
downfall.  
On March 25, 1977, the GOP announced the “autonomy of 13 provinces.”112 This 
would produce and formally recognize the 13 autonomous “provinces in Mindanao and 
Palawan.”113 However, less than a month later, President Marcos “called for a plebiscite-
referendum.”114 The MNLF expressed great dissatisfaction and its opposition to the 
president’s decision to hold a referendum. At no time during the peace negotiations had 
either party mentioned or discussed anything about conducting a referendum.115 
108 Rood, Interlocking Autonomy, 262. 
109 May, Obstacles to Conflict Resolution, 280. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 908. 
113 Rood, Interlocking Autonomy, 257. 
114 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 908. 
115 Ibid. 
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The heavily protested referendum produced “two autonomous regional 
governments” in Mindanao instead of one single unit that was originally agreed on.116 
The voting created Region IX that comprised of territory in Western Mindanao and 
Region XII that comprised of territory in Central Mindanao.117 Region IX was made up 
of the “Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur” 
provinces.118 Region XII was made up of the “Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, North 
Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat” provinces.119 The referendum results 
reduced the initially discussed 13 provinces down to “10 provinces” between two 
autonomous regions.120 President Marcos executed this plan, despite OIC warnings to 
implement what was originally discussed.121 The GOP’s exclusion of “South Cotabato, 
Davao del Sur, and Palawan” from the implementation was explained to the Moros as 
unimportant and irrelevant since “Muslims in these areas constituted a minority.”122 Even 
OIC actions that would award “observer status to the MNLF in 1978” would not scare 
President Marcos away from implementing the referendum’s results.123 The MNLF saw 
the exclusion of provinces as another attempt to fragment Moro unity, weaken Moro 
strength, and as another opportunity to secede.124  
Though the framework of the government in Mindanao changed, most of the 
previous bureaucratic mechanisms and economic status remained unchanged. The 
creation of two separate autonomous regions did place some Moros in high-ranking 
bureaucratic positions; however, the majority of the office holders were identified as 
Marcos loyalists.125 The economic situation in Mindanao still showed no promises of 
116 May, Obstacles to Conflict Resolution, 280. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 908. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Rood, Interlocking Autonomy, 258. 
121 Quimpo, The Pitfalls, 117. 
122 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 908. 
123 Quimpo, The Pitfalls, 117. 
124 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 909. 
125 Ibid. 
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improvement, GOP military influence in the region was still strong, and bureaucratic 
actions by the region still required President Marcos’ approval.126  
Deviation from the original agreement made it clear to Nur Misuari that “the 
Tripoli Agreement was ... null and void because the government had never intended to 
abide by it and had in fact violated it.”127 The original agreement promised the MNLF 
one autonomous region of 13 provinces, but instead created two separate autonomous 
regions with 10 provinces. The GOP failed to properly implement the Tripoli Agreement 
by splitting the three regions into three separate entities.128 If the autonomy promised 
would not be honored, then the MNLF fight to separate from the state would continue.129 
As a result, 1977 brought the return of armed conflict between the MNLF and GOP and 
talks of secession.130 
C. CONCLUSION 
The failure of the Tripoli Agreement can be attributed to the GOP’s inability to 
completely implement the original conditions that both groups consented to at the signing 
of the agreement. Failure to completely implement the conditions worsened the situation 
and forced the MNLF to resume armed conflict in their quest for self-determination. 
Exclusivity was not a contributing factor to the collapse. There were no issues with 
exclusivity since all major Moro parties were involved. During the conflict there were no 
other separatist groups. Additionally, opposing Christian groups in the region had not 
been as violent and as vocal as the MNLF. The MNLF represented the Moro Muslims of 
Mindanao, while the GOP represented the state. This section discusses the effects of the 
failure to completely implement the agreement and how it led to the collapse of the 
Tripoli Agreement. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 909. 
128 Engineer, Struggle For A Separate Islamic State, 2156. 
129 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 909. 
130 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 826. 
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Failure to completely implement conditions of the Tripoli Agreement was the 
major reason for the agreement’s collapse. Ivan Molloy states that the MNLF accused the 
GOP of intentionally manipulating conditions of the agreement to allow political strength 
to remain with Manila.131 Molloy claims that President Marcos’ plebiscite referendum, 
which was never discussed, allowed for the GOP to “water down the degree of self-
determination it had initially agreed to grant the” Moros.132 Cesar Adib Majul adds that 
the MNLF “charged...the government with bad faith” when the referendum produced 
“two autonomous regions” of 10 provinces instead of the one autonomous region of 13 
provinces that both parties agreed to.133 Majul argues that once the GOP began executing 
the implementation of “two autonomous regions,” it was evident that President Marcos 
had always maintained an agenda of keeping “the Muslims divided.”134  
The MNLF saw this autonomous divide as a serious violation of the 
agreement.135 The split of autonomy into two different bodies produced a more “limited 
effectiveness.”136 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo states that the referendum proves that 
President Marcos “was not really serious about a just and lasting peace in Mindanao.”137 
Asghar Ali Engineer claims that the GOP “reneged and implemented what suited it.”138 
The MNLF considered the agreement an official order from President Marcos.139 Despite 
the many MNLF attempts to communicate their disapproval, President Marcos continued 
with the plebiscite referendum.140 Doing so created “distrust” on both sides.141 The 
agreement produced little political benefits for the Moros and severely weakened the 
131 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 826. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 908. 
134 Ibid., 909. 
135 Rood, Interlocking Autonomy, 258. 
136 May, Obstacles to Conflict Resolution, 280. 
137 Quimpo, The Pitfalls, 116–17. 
138 Engineer, The Moro Struggle, 2114. 
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with MNLF and GAM. (Singapore, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005). 
140 Harish, Towards Better Peace Processes, 6. 
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MNLF.142 President Marcos’ concept was simple. The division of power into smaller 
entities allowed for the GOP to maintain overarching control of the region and country.  
If the original conditions had been completely implemented, regardless of 
whether or not economic and living standards improved, armed conflict between the GOP 
and MNLF may have been resolved. Instead the GOP executed what they desired and 
blamed the GOP’s failure to completely implement conditions on “rifts within the 
MNLF” and not knowing “which MNLF leader to talk to.”143 As a result, by purposely 
misinterpreting the conditions, “the MNLF returned to its original demand of secession 
and fighting resumed” in Mindanao.144 Thomas M. McKenna provides that these Moro 
calls for “full implementation of the agreement signed in Tripoli” would stretch into the 
1980s.145 
In conclusion, the GOP’s failure to completely implement the agreement was 
directly responsible for the collapse of the Tripoli Agreement. The GOP’s failure to 
completely implement the agreement in combination with the results of a referendum that 
manipulated the autonomy defined at the signing of the agreement suggested to MNLF 
that establishing sustainable peace was never intended. 
  
142 Thomas M. McKenna, “Mindanao People Unite: Failed Attempts at Muslim-Christian Unity,” in 
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University Press, 2008), 125. 
143 Quimpo, The Pitfalls, 117. 
144 Molloy, The Question of an Alliance, 826. 
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III. 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT 
The 1996 Final Peace Agreement marked another major attempt at peace between 
the Moros and Government of the Philippines (GOP). The willingness to meet with the 
Moros displayed the GOP’s commitment to recovering from the failure of the Tripoli 
Agreement. Though the process yielded similar results to the Tripoli Agreement, the 
Final Peace Agreement of 1996 also provided lessons learned that were valuable to future 
attempts at resolution. 
Failure to completely implement the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 caused a 
reemergence of violence and an internal struggle within the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF). The internal conflict eventually gave birth to the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF), a separatist splinter group headed by Salamat Hashim.146 Originally, 
Salamat Hashim engaged the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), deemed Nur 
Misuari unfit to lead the organization, and sought permission to seat himself as the head 
of the MNLF.147 However, the former “chairman of the foreign affairs bureau” failed at 
his attempt to dethrone Nur Misuari as MNLF chairman, resulting in the MILF’s 
creation.148 The MILF officially became its own unit “in the 1980s, advocating a more 
Islamic identity based approach to the Moro struggle.”149 The breakaway of the MILF 
from the MNLF can be explained by the contrast in ideological viewpoints between the 
MNLF’s Nur Misuari and the MILF’s Salamat Hashim.150 Specifically, Hashim did not 
support the agreement between the MNLF and the GOP during the creation of the Tripoli 
Agreement of 1976.151 This non-concurrence eventually led to the split of the Islamic 
MILF from the “secular MNLF.”152 
146 Martin and Tuminez, Toward Peace, 3. 
147 May, Obstacles to Conflict Resolution, 281. 
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Following the People Power Revolution and forceful exit of President Ferdinand 
Marcos, Corazon Aquino assumed the helm of the presidency. An attempt to resolve the 
conflict in Mindanao was initiated by President Corazon Aquino in 1986.153 Discussions 
between the GOP and the MNLF would bring revisions to Mindanao’s autonomy during 
the production of the Philippine Constitution in 1987.154 The original request 
recommended the recognition of Mindanao and other regions in the country as individual 
and autonomous states under one federal entity.155 A downgrade of this recommendation 
consequently mapped out a certain degree of autonomy for Mindanao. A specially 
assigned Regional Consultative Commission was tasked to formulate specifics of the 
autonomous conditions.156 The Philippine Congress later assumed this responsibility and 
finalized these conditions. The Philippine Congress eventually became responsible for 
the passing of the “Organic Law (Republic Act 6734).”157 Republic Act 6734 was the 
law that defined the autonomy and established the rules that governed the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).158 
The talks between President Aquino and Nur Misuari produced a law that 
established the ARMM.159 The Organic Law passed in 1989 led to a plebiscite that 
resulted in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi officially 
becoming part of the ARMM.160 The ARMM would be made up of four out of the 13 
provinces that the MNLF had been fighting for. These were the only provinces that voted 
in favor of becoming part of the ARMM.161 The final composition of what became the 
autonomous region was an extreme deviation from the MNLF’s original demand. The 
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MNLF’s exclusion from the plebiscite led to protests against the process.162 However, 
upon conclusion of the plebiscite, the ARMM finally began functioning as an 
autonomous entity in 1990.163 
This temporary solution would momentarily reduce armed conflict throughout the 
Mindanao region; however, the fact remained that the MNLF was still without a peace 
treaty. Since the Organic Law only covered a portion of the original demands, it was 
obvious that the MNLF would eventually grow unsatisfied with the terms crafted in 1987.  
Fidel Ramos eventually succeeded President Corazon Aquino in 1992. In an effort 
to establish peace between the GOP and the MNLF, “former [head of the] Armed Forces 
of the Philippines Fidel V. Ramos,” now turned president, would attempt to develop a 
peace agreement.164 President Ramos surprised the Moros with his request to restart talks 
with MNLF’s Nur Misuari.165 Consequently, the GOP and MNLF began another round at 
the negotiating table. These talks between the MNLF and GOP created the Final Peace 
Agreement of 1996.166 This agreement also came to be known as the “Final Agreement 
on the Implementation of the Tripoli Agreement.”167 
A. NEGOTIATION OF PEACE AGREEMENT 
The negotiations that produced the 1996 Final Peace Agreement were mediated 
by the OIC and occurred in two phases. The first phase of negotiations updated prior laws 
that assisted with legitimizing the ARMM as a functioning government. The second 
phase established institutions that ARMM needed to function.  
President Ramos’ decision to revive peace talks brought the GOP, MNLF, OIC 
and Indonesia together for another attempt at reaching sustainable peace.168 The OIC 
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mediated the discussions, while Indonesia hosted the negotiation.169 The discussions 
brought the development of a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and of 
the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD).170 In the 
SZOPAD, cities and provincial areas under the jurisdiction of the Tripoli agreement 
would be subjected to a three-year effort that worked on improving peace and 
development in Mindanao; establishing the SPCPD involved creating an institution that 
managed and monitored all organizational activities occurring in the SZOPAD dedicated 
to improving peace and development. The chairman of the SPCPD was also afforded the 
opportunity to appoint a religious advisory council for advice during their time in office; 
the SPCPD received its monetary support and remained under the control of the 
president. Nur Misuari received the first appointment as chair of the SPCPD.171  
The discussions between the GOP and MNLF were also responsible for the 
creation of a Consultative Assembly and the retirement of the Bangsa Moro Army 
(BMA).172 The Consultative Assembly was comprised of 81 members, where 44 of the 
members would be assigned to the MNLF. The Consultative Assembly’s purpose was to 
convene, consult, and appropriately advise the SPCPD. It was also allowed to 
communicate policy recommendations through the SPCPD chairman.173 The BMA, 
which served as the MNLF’s military component was to be eliminated under conditions 
of the agreement. The BMA’s services, however, would not be terminated. Upon 
successful disbandment of the MNLF’s military forces, “7,500 BMA troops were to be 
recruited into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National 
Police (PNP).”174 The remaining soldiers who did not transition into army or police force 
were provided with enrollment into state developed program that assisted soldiers with 
transition back into civil society. This program focused on “socio-economic, cultural, and 
educational” lessons that would assist soldiers and family members in obtaining 
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“education, technical skills, and livelihood training” that could be utilized in the outside 
world.175 
The Final Peace Agreement was executed in two stages.176 The first stage 
replaced the 1987 Organic Law that gave recognition to the ARMM with the creation of 
legislation that would allow for the Final Peace Agreement to take effect. Upon 
presidential approval, the legislation would be subjected to “a plebiscite in the SZOPAD 
within two years from the establishment of the SPCPD.”177 This plebiscite determined 
what areas would become a part of the region.178 The first stage was to be accomplished 
in no more than three years. The second stage brought the development “of an executive 
council, legislative assembly, and administration with legislative powers in the area of 
autonomy” and the creation “of Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF).”179 The 
security forces to be established would be “a PNP regional command” within the 
Mindanao region. The second stage also addressed education. This stage recognized 
Islamic schools, implemented an educational curriculum that taught both Islamic and 
Filipino ideologies, and allowed for the Arabic language to be utilized in classrooms.180 
Additionally, the autonomy granted during the second stage allowed for the Moro 
government to “contract foreign and domestic loans.”181 
The first draft of the Final Peace Agreement took four years to develop and was 
completed in June 1996.182 The completion of the draft agreement was met with protests 
from the Christian political community of Mindanao.183 This community contested the 
agreement in the form of demonstrations and warned that violence would occur if the 
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agreement were not reconsidered.184 Congress accused President Ramos of ‘selling out’ 
to the Moros. The Senate lobbied for the reduction of the autonomous power granted to 
the Consultative Assembly and SPCPD. The House of Representatives claimed that they 
would halt funding to the autonomous region. A petition from a number of Congressional 
legislators and a provincial governor was even submitted to the Supreme Court declaring 
that the agreement was unconstitutional.185 In the end, the Moros lost their “44 MNLF 
members in the Consultative Assembly...and the provisions of the agreement which 
placed specified government agencies under the control and/or supervision of the SPCPD 
were deleted.”186 After the political backlash, President Ramos approved the adjustments 
to the agreement; however, President Ramos held firm on the major conditions.187 The 
Final Peace Agreement between the GOP and the MNLF was finally signed in September 
1996.188 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation of the agreement brought disappointing results towards achieving 
a satisfying level of self-determination and introduced another insurgency. Though some 
labeled the Final Peace Agreement a major success, the changes made significantly 
weakened the autonomy originally promised.189 As a result, the autonomous government 
of the ARMM was ineffective in its attempts to improve economic growth and the Moro 
quality of life.190 Additionally, the GOP was left with having to deal with MILF that split 
from the MNLF due to ideological differences.  
The MILF’s agenda was more religious than that of the secular MNLF.191 The 
MILF’s exclusion from the agreement had warranted the need for a GOP response. At the 
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conclusion of the signing, the GOP shortly began negotiations with the MILF in January 
1997.192 The inability to achieve any type of progress with the GOP led the MILF to 
respond with armed conflict.193 During GOP and MNLF negotiations, the MILF had 
amassed a great number of soldiers and sympathizers to its cause.194  They had collected 
“more than 12,000 armed fighters in 13 major camps and 33 satellite enclaves.”195 The 
MILF successfully established itself as a bigger threat than Nur Misuari’s MNLF. In 
March 2000, President Joseph Estrada responded to the deadlock in negotiations by 
declaring war against the MILF.196 
Concurrently, the ARMM faced several problems during implementation of the 
agreement. During the early stages of Nur Misuari’s tenure as SPCPD chairman, 
enormous amounts of money began funneling its way into the region by way of the GOP 
and various external organizations in support of Mindanao’s growth and development.197 
Nur Misuari also received plenty of financial support to fund economic projects from 
neighboring states and various Muslim organizations. In a five-year stretch, the GOP 
donated approximately 1.65 billion U.S. dollars to the region.198 The United Nations 
Multi-Donor Assistance Program also pledged its support to Mindanao with donations 
estimated at approximately 319 million U.S. dollars.199 
In 2001, the SPCPD chairman was accused of mismanaging funds. Nur Misuari’s 
colleagues had discredited him from his position due to poor “management of funds, 
arbitrary leadership style, patronage, and corrupt practices.”200 Nur Misuari was accused 
of stealing money from various economic projects and utilizing expensive budgets during 
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overseas travel. Across the region, these accusations were accepted by some as reasons 
why the economic situation and lives of the Moros had not improved.201 As a result of 
the accusations, Nur Misuari, under the approval of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 
was removed from his positions as ARMM governor and SPCPD chairman. Misuari 
heavily contested what he believed to be an unlawful removal; however, he was 
eventually replaced by Muslimin G. Sema as SPCPD chairman and Farouk Hussin as 
ARMM governor.202 
Nur Misuari responded to his removal as ARMM governor and SPCPD chairman 
with armed attacks on Philippine military bases on Jolo. He commanded 600 ARMM 
soldiers to attack four military bases.203 Nur Misuari repositioned himself in Malaysia, 
but was later returned to face charges from the GOP.204 The former MNLF head was 
eventually “charged with rebellion, sedition, and corruption.”205 His actions were 
punished with a six and half year sentence.206 Nur Misuari would promise a return; 
however, his absence left his replacements attempting to run Mindanao under the 
conditions of the Final Peace Agreement.207 
C. CONCLUSION 
The 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the GOP and the MNLF is a failed 
peace agreement.208 Rather than achieving sustainable peace, tension and fighting 
continued to build. Jacques Bertrand states that the failure of the 1996 Final Peace 
Agreement can be credited to numerous factors such as: the MNLF’s inability to 
effectively manage the ARMM, the weakness of the autonomy granted and institutions 
created from the Final Peace Agreement, the fractionalization between the MNLF and 
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MILF, and its inability to address important past grievances. While all reasons listed by 
Bertrand have played important roles in the agreement’s collapse, this study argues that 
two reasons were directly responsible for the failure of the peace agreement. This study 
argues that the MNLF’s failure to completely implement the agreement and the exclusion 
of major non-state actors like the MILF and Christians of Mindanao ultimately caused the 
Final Peace Agreement’s failure. First, the MNLF’s inability to completely implement 
the agreement created a corrupt Nur Misuari and local government environment.209 
Corruption and the misuse of funds by Misuari hindered the peace agreement’s full 
ability to be completely implemented. Second, exclusion of the MILF and Christians by 
the GOP from the agreement hindered the chances of sustainable peace throughout the 
region. Though armed conflict between the GOP and MNLF momentarily ceased, the 
MILF continued armed conflict where the MNLF left off. Additionally, exclusion of the 
Christians left key grievances like the “restoration of lost lands” that caused the 
“displacement of Muslims from their lands” due to Christian migration forced by the 
GOP unresolved.210 
Nur Misuari’s failure to completely implement the agreement within the ARMM, 
led to corrupt practices. During his term, there was increasing doubt in Nur Misuari’s 
ability to lead the region amongst the Moro population.211 Many people across the region 
believed that hiring practices favored MNLF sympathizers and that corruption in the 
regional government was blatant.212  Gordon Means states that during Nur Misuari’s 
reign as governor, the ARMM received close to two billion U.S dollars from the GOP 
and United Nations towards growth and the development of the region.213 Nur Misuari 
was found guilty of misusing ARMM funds.214 During this time, improvement would be 
absent and the ARMM was still considered “amongst the nation’s poorest” provinces in 
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the Philippines.215 If Nur Misuari completely implemented the agreement, institutional 
systems that affect the region’s economic situation and quality of life of the Moros may 
have produced a different outcome. His corrupt practices hindered the Final Peace 
Agreement from taking its course. The agreement’s potential and ability to determine 
success was blocked by Nur Misuari’s incomplete implementation of the Final Peace 
Agreement. Mel Labrador also credits the agreement’s collapse to incomplete 
implementation.216 While this study points to the MNLF as the reason the agreement was 
not fully implemented, the MNLF accuses the GOP of not following through with the 
conditions set by the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.217 Because of Misuari’s actions, “the 
agreement failed to get past the initial transition phase and the full Muslim autonomy 
promised in the accord was not achieved.”218 
The exclusion of the MILF from the peace agreement led to a continuation of 
armed conflict within the region. Exclusion from the peace agreement initiated the start 
of substantial fighting by the MILF against the GOP.219 Fighting between the MILF and 
the GOP began in less than one month’s signing of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.220 
Since the GOP chose to exclusively work with the MNLF on the 1996 Final Peace 
Agreement, the MILF attacks that followed its signing forced the GOP into another set of 
negotiations.221  
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The exclusion of this non-state actor delivered armed conflict with demands for 
“the creation of a separate Islamic state as soon as possible.”222 The completion of the 
Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF, eventually led Philippine President Fidel Ramos 
to open a separate peace negotiation process with the MILF. A deadlock in negotiations 
between 1996 and 2000 brought President Joseph Estrada’s call for war against the 
MILF.223 The MILF and other excluded groups, like the Christians and Lumads, were 
left with unanswered grievances and demands from the GOP. The GOP and MNLF 
hoped that the peace agreement’s expected increase in foreign aid and future 
improvements in quality of life would capture the undivided support of the Christians and 
indigenous peoples of the region.224 If the MILF had been originally included during the 
MNLF negotiation process, the probability of the continuation of armed conflict would 
have been unlikely. The signing of the peace agreement would likely have been extended 
past 1996; however, additional time to include, discuss, and address the issues of all 
groups concerned would have increased the chances for sustainable peace in Mindanao. 
The completion of the Final Peace Agreement left only one out of the many groups on 
Mindanao satisfied.  
Exclusion of the Christians, another influential non-state actor, contributed to the 
derailment of the agreement. Exclusion from the process left longstanding grievances 
unanswered. Their inclusion was vital since a majority of the provinces on Mindanao had 
Christian majority populations.225 It was important that the GOP moderated “extreme 
demands of the MNLF” due to “potential dangers arousing a non-Muslim backlash” in 
Mindanao.226 Excluding the Christians suggests that the likelihood of sustainable peace 
was unlikely. Jacques Bertrand states that the exclusion of important issues like the Moro 
“land ownership” prevented the Final Peace Agreement from becoming a 
222 De Castro, Weakness and Gambits, 703. 
223 Bacani, Mindanao Peace Talks, 5. 
224 Bertrand, Peace and Conflict, 52. 
225 R. J. May, “Muslim and Tribal Filipinos,” in the Philippines After Marcos, ed. R. J. May and 
Francisco Nemenzo (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 124. 
226 May, Muslim and Tribal Filipinos, 124. 
 35 
                                                 
“comprehensive resolution of conflict in Mindanao.”227 During the GOP sponsored 
Christian migration into Mindanao, the Moros were subjected to “decades of 
displacement...from their lands.”228 The displacement caused years of tension between 
the Christian and Muslim populations. Bertrand claims that addressing land issues would 
further progress Christian and Muslim relations.229 If a solution to the land issues can be 
fashioned, economic opportunities for the Moros would be created and Moro poverty 
throughout the region may decrease. If land issues are left unanswered, then Moro 
“frustrations” may lead into the “resumption of hostilities.”230 This was certainly a major 
factor resulting in the failure of the Final Peace Agreement. 
In closing, the MNLF’s inability to completely implement the agreement and 
exclusion of the MILF and Christians with grievances like land rights were the major 
drivers in causing the Final Peace Agreement’s failure. The economic situation and Moro 
quality of life would have likely been different if Nur Misuari completely implemented 
the agreement. If the MILF and other groups like the Christians were included during the 
negotiations, unanswered grievances may have been resolved and the continuation of 
armed conflict in the region may have been unlikely. Growing tensions would likely have 
been low and the probability of the Final Peace Agreement’s success would have been 
higher if important and sensitive issues such as land disputes between the Christians and 
Muslims were discussed and resolved.  
Others reasons have contributed to the failure of the peace agreement; however, 
issues with the MNLF’s inability to completely implement the peace agreement and its 
exclusivity were the major reasons why the 1996 Final Peace Agreement failed. 
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IV. 2008 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON ANCESTRAL 
DOMAIN 
Philippine President Joseph Estrada’s order for war in 2000 against the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Force (MILF) insurgents was reversed after the relinquishment of his 
office to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; President Macapagal-Arroyo’s peaceful approach 
and change in policy in early 2001 brought the MILF back to the negotiating table.231 A 
resumption of GOP-MILF peace negotiations was supported with a Malaysian mediated 
agreement for a mutual ceasefire in August 2001; in the same year, the Government of 
the Philippines (GOP) passed legislation in an effort to expand the Autonomous Region 
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in accordance with Final Peace Agreement of 1996.232 
Senate Bill 2129 proposed a further expansion of the ARMM’s autonomous control of 
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. The approval of an expansion 
stretched its domain “to 15 provinces and 14 cities.”233 The bill was followed by a 
plebiscite in August 2001.234 Voters cast their votes in a decision “to join the four, small 
Muslim majority provinces already in the ARMM.”235 Rejection by the Christian 
communities of Mindanao was obvious in the final results.236 However, the outcome 
expanded the ARMM’s control with the additions of the Basilan Province and Marawi 
City.237 The results finalized in the GOP’s Republic Act (RA) No. 9054. RA No. 9054 or 
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao served as the 
replacement to Organic Law, better known as the RA No. 6734.238 
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Continued peace talks led to the creation of the “Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 
2001” and the “Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF 
Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001.”239 This agreement continued the ceasefire and 
established the “Joint Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities, the 
International Monitoring Team (composed of representatives from Malaysia, Brunei 
Darussalam, and Libya), and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group.”240 The agreement was 
signed in May 2002 and served as a one of the many precursors to the Memorandum of 
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain of 2008.241 This agreement focused on security, 
while a preceding arrangement in 2002 focused on “humanitarian, rehabilitation, and 
development issues.”242 In 2005, discussions concerning ancestral land belonging to the 
Moros surfaced. Early 2006 further defined the arrangements on “points of agreement on 
ancestral domain” that was signed in September 2005 between the GOP and MILF.243 
Later that year, Malaysia hosted formalized talks between the GOP and MILF in 
September to map out which area was considered ancestral domain.244 The GOP 
extended an offer to transform the ARMM into what would be called the Bangsamoro 
Juridical Entity (BJE). Details of the offer included the expansion of the ARMM with 
“613 villages...identified as having Muslim majorities” and “greater fiscal autonomy” 
that allowed for an increase in the “share of profits from natural resources, including 
minerals and petroleum.”245 The MILF rejected the offer and returned with a 
counterproposal that included absolute ownership of all resources and 1,000 extra 
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villages; a stalemate between both groups temporarily halted peace talks between the 
GOP and MILF.246  
The MILF also began showing signs of decline in strength; inability to resolve 
conflicts internally resulted in the creation of different factions within the organization. 
The MILF also announced that even if an agreement were to be signed, decommissioning 
of their army would not be executed.247 Additionally, a regional conflict involving a 
MILF faction against the Ampatuan family exposed that a transfer of governing powers 
to the MILF from the powerful oligarchs of Mindanao was extremely difficult. The 
MILF’s war within made peace seem unreachable. On the other end, GOP victories 
against the Abu Sayyaf insurgency from 2006 to 2007 further halted peace talks with the 
MILF. In June 2007, a kidnapping of a civilian led the GOP to further question whether 
peace talks should even be continued. The search for the MILF-kidnapped Italian priest 
led a group of Philippine Marines into an ambush. All 14 Marines were killed.248 This 
incident was responsible for stopping GOP and MILF peace negotiations scheduled for 
August 2007. 
A. NEGOTIATION OF PEACE AGREEMENT 
The road that led to the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
(MOA-AD) was a turbulent one. Talks to achieve conflict resolution between the GOP 
and MILF eventually occurred in late 2007.249 A disagreement in the control of natural 
resources on Mindanao halted the progress of the negotiations. The GOP stated that in the 
laws of the Constitution, natural resources are always completely controlled by the 
government.250 The MILF argued that this was in violation of the agreement during their 
peace talks in 2006; the MILF’s discontent in the matter led to a threat of non-attendance 








                                                 
a constitutional change to incorporate the formation of a federal Bangsamoro would be 
considered; this GOP consideration resulted in the resurfacing of the Moro National 
Liberation Front (MNLF), which claimed that agreement between the GOP and MILF 
was considered a violation of 1996 Final Peace Agreement.252 Once again, inability to 
come to an agreement placed the process in deadlock status.253 
A brief pause in the peace process occurred in early 2008; however, negotiations 
found their way back after Malaysia’s self-removal from the process.254 Malaysia 
announced that they would remove themselves from the process due to lack of progress, 
hoping that it would push both groups in reattempting to complete the agreement. 
Malaysia’s troops played a major role by monitoring the mutual ceasefire between the 
GOP and MILF forces. Malaysia’s departure produced fear and resulted in both ends 
accusing the other of stalling negotiations.255 The GOP responded to the redeployment of 
troops back to Malaysia by increasing troop presence in Mindanao. The MILF responded 
to the increase of GOP presence with threats of heightened violence.256 
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s team eventually hashed out 
details on the concept behind the BJE.257 This was a direct result of concern that extreme 
violence would soon be coming if negotiations further stalled.258 The BJE granted an 
extension of the ARMM’s autonomous control.259 Both groups formulated a draft 
agreement that the International Crisis Group (ICG) described “as an extraordinary and 
radical document giving the BJE far more sweeping powers than what the 2005 Helsinki 
agreement between the Indonesian Government and the Acehnese rebels extended to 
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autonomous Aceh.”260 The BJE concept would welcome “an additional 712 barangays” 
into the ARMM, and would also be subjected to a plebiscite following the agreement’s 
signing.261  
After years and years of negotiating, the GOP and MILF finally arrived at an 
agreement that granted the Moros an expansion of the ARMM into a suitably sized 
autonomous region.262 The agreement also allowed for the Moros to exercise control 
over “police and internal security forces,...education ...and ...natural resources within the 
territory.”263 Lastly, the Moros were free to design “banking ...and political institutions” 
for the region.264 This autonomous region to be established was called the Bangsamoro 
Juridical Entity (BJE). The signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral 
Domain (MOA-AD) was booked for August 2008 and scheduled to be hosted by 
Malaysia.265 
The signing of the MOA-AD did not occur as planned. Government officials from 
the Christian community of Mindanao greeted the signing of the agreement with 
discontent.266 These politicians labeled the GOP supported agreement “as a sell-out to 
the Moro rebels.”267 Others described the agreement as “an unnecessary sacrifice of the 
country’s territorial integrity.”268 Some accused President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of 
utilizing the constitutional amendment process as a method to extend her time in 
office.269 Local governments of proposed areas to be annexed into the BJE submitted a 
petition to the Supreme Court calling for a temporary halt to the MOA-AD signing and a 
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thorough review of the agreement.270 On the day prior to the signing scheduled for 
August 5, 2008, the Supreme Court ordered a restraining order in response to petitions 
submitted, that prevented the GOP from participating in the signing of the MOA-AD.271 
The Supreme Court investigated the petitions and ruled against “the MOA-AD’s 
constitutionality.”272 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
Due to the judicial ruling, the MOA-AD was never given the opportunity to be 
implemented. The GOP eventually backed out and called an end to the negotiation 
process. Had the agreement been signed, the GOPs behavior during the negotiation 
process indicates that complete implementation would be unlikely. This section discusses 
the events that led to the collapse that prevented MOA-AD implementation. 
The restraining order and Supreme Court investigation signaled the start of an end 
to the MOA-AD. Failure to sign the agreement re-started armed conflict between the 
GOP and MILF. The GOP blamed the re-start of violence on the MILF and provided that 
future peace negotiations in Mindanao would be inclusive of all groups rather than just 
one. As a result, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo disbanded all negotiating efforts. 
The GOP eventually dissolved the peace panel and quickly initiated a movement to 
combat ongoing MILF attacks.273 
In the 8–7 vote that declared the agreement unconstitutional, the Supreme Court 
described the mechanism used to develop the agreement as an abuse of power.274 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s abandonment of peace efforts with the MILF and 
the Supreme Court’s ruling terminated any remaining hope for the MOA-AD to be 
270 Hicken, The Philippines in 2008, 194. 
271 Quimpo, The Pitfalls, 114. 
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signed. Failure to sign the 2008 agreement led to more violence, deaths, and 
displacement.275   
C. CONCLUSION 
The judicial ruling that the MOA-AD was unconstitutional brought an end to the 
agreement between the GOP and MILF. Nathan Quimpo attributes the failure of the 
agreement to the following problems: the agreement gave the Moros too much autonomy, 
the unpreparedness for protests from the Christian political community of Mindanao, and 
the GOP’s fixation with constitutional change as a way of facilitating the MOA-AD’s 
implementation.276 While all three factors played roles in the collapse, this study suggests 
one other reason that was the major contributor to the agreement’s failure. Failure of the 
2008 agreement can be blamed on the exclusivity of the negotiation process. Exclusivity 
of the negotiations perpetuated armed conflict in the region. If the negotiation process 
been more inclusive, then the “trauma” caused by the “‘botched’ MOA-AD” would have 
been unlikely.277 
The MOA-AD proposed the BJE concept, which addressed Moro land issues and 
proposed an autonomous arrangement that would have allowed the Moros to obtain their 
long desired self-determination.278 These conditions were thoroughly discussed by both 
the GOP and MILF.279 At the conclusion of the agreement, the GOP stated that under the 
laws of the Philippine Constitution, all territorial reconfigurations must be subjected to a 
plebiscite.280 As a result, the requirement for a plebiscite was included into the 
framework of the MOA-AD.281 
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The MILF completely disagreed with submitting the boundaries under conditions 
of the MOA-AD through a plebiscite.282 Historically, results of past plebiscites have 
changed the original terms of the previous failed agreements. The Tripoli Agreement of 
1976 and the Final Peace Agreement of 1996 were both subjected to plebiscites and 
produced results that gave the MNLF less territory and autonomous coverage than what 
the was originally discussed. The disappointing results of the 1976 and 1996 plebiscites 
for the MNLF ultimately contributed to the return of violence in the region. Ronald May 
discusses the MILF’s opposition to plebiscites due to knowledge of past outcomes that 
resulted in watered down autonomy.283 If the GOP wanted to completely implement the 
agreement, then the GOP should have worked to eliminate the requirement for a 
plebiscite from the constitution. Additionally, if past plebiscites are known to produce 
unsatisfactory results, why go through all the effort of negotiating something that would 
be ultimately opposed?  
The exclusion of important groups from negotiations to reach the MOA-AD of 
2008 played a significant role in the failure of the agreement. The Asia-Pacific Human 
Rights Information Center (Hurights Osaka) states that the GOP reconsidered and 
ultimately failed to sign the agreement due to backlash from groups left out of the 
negotiation process, especially the Christian government officials in Mindanao.284 
Protests by the Mindanao Christians were pivotal in turning the GOP against the 2008 
agreement.285  Displeased with the conditions of the agreement, Christian politicians 
submitted a petition to the Philippine Supreme Court to investigate the legality of the 
agreement.286 Additionally, Thomas Lum states that these excluded groups also provided 
some form of opposition to the 2008 agreement:  “splinter groups of the MILF, such as 
the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement,...MNLF leaders who fear loss of political 
influence under a new entity, powerful local families or clans, and members of the 
282 May, Obstacles to Conflict Resolution, 287. 
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government and army who want to see the MILF further weakened.”287 If President 
Macapagal-Arroyo included Christian representation during the negotiation process, the 
petition that led to the unconstitutionality ruling by the GOP’s judicial branch may have 
never been submitted. Consequently, an inclusive agreement may have ceased influential 
non-state actor opposition and may have increased the likelihood of approval.  
Gordon Means also states that during the negotiation process of this agreement, 
the MNLF had expressed to the GOP that any agreement signed between with the MILF 
was an infringement on the Final Peace Agreement signed in 1996.288 Additionally, 
Steven Rood states that various government officials within Mindanao “objected to the 
lack of consultation, before the agreement, on the scope of geographic coverage, and the 
powers being offered.”289 Rood adds that populations of proposed areas to be included 
into the BJE should have been included in the negotiation process. Jennifer M. Keister 
states that this event provides a perfect example of how influential “politically and 
economically powerful non-Moros in Mindanao” were during this process.290 Had the 
peace negotiation included representation from all groups from the region like the 
Christian community, the MNLF, the MILF, and the indigenous peoples, the probability 
of signing the agreement would have been more likely.  
In closing, exclusivity of the agreement heavily contributed to the downfall of the 
2008 MOA-AD. Had the agreement been more inclusive and completely implemented, 
the 2008 agreement may have likely succeeded. 
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V.  2014 COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE 
BANGSAMORO  
The 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is the latest 
peace agreement dealing with the Moro conflict in Mindanao. During the course of this 
conflict, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) and the Moros have made several 
attempts at peace, but have been unable to achieve conflict resolution. The latest 
agreement has seen a turbulent path, where some might question if sustainable peace will 
ever be reached. Many hope that the CAB will do what the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the 
1996 Final Peace Agreement, and the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral 
Domain (MOA-AD) have failed to do. With strong efforts from both the GOP and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an agreement to reach sustainable peace may 
have come to fruition. This section discusses the history that facilitated the negotiation 
process of the CAB.  
Following the collapse of the 2008 MOA-AD, a return to the negotiating table and 
another attempt at sustainable peace surfaced in 2010.291 Between these years, the MILF 
found themselves involved in an attack on Philippine forces traveling to Mindanao in 
search of improvised explosive device (IED) factory.292 This 2009 ambush took the lives 
of “23 Marines …and 21 guerillas.”293  The MILF’s harassment of the local population 
and conflict with the GOP continued until both sides eventually conceded to restarting 
negotiations.294  
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Malaysia hosted the peace talks held between the MILF and the GOP with 
incumbent Philippine President Benigno Aquino III.295 In early 2011, the MILF 
submitted to the GOP a request to restore conditions of the unsigned 2008 agreement.296 
The request was met with strong resistance from the Christian communities of 
Mindanao.297 Conflict between the Moros and Christians further delayed the peace 
process. Though the restoration of the MOA-AD did not occur, the GOP noted that 
achieving resolution with the MILF during Benigno Aquino III’s presidency was quite 
possible. In an August 2011 meeting hosted by Japan, President Aquino and MILF leader 
Murad Ibrahim agreed on the expedition of peace negotiations between both groups.298 
In 2003, Murad Ibrahim assumed MILF chairman duties following the death of MILF 
founder Hashim Salamat.299 
During the fragile but standing ceasefire, the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines (GRP)-MILF Decision Points on Principles was signed in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia in April 2012.300 The conditions of this document established the “Bangsamoro 
as a secular political unit within the Philippines, located within its territory and subject to 
its sovereignty as a state.”301 Subsequently in October 2012 at the Exploratory Talks on 
the Peace Process, both groups approved the initial conditions of an agreement that 
eventually became the CAB.302 During the “32nd round” of the Malaysian hosted talks, 
the GOP and MILF discussed the “creation of a Bangsamoro entity to replace the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which is composed of five Muslim-
dominated provinces on the huge island, which totals about 95,000 square kilometers.”303 
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At the completion of the discussions, the GOP and MILF signed a timeline that mapped 
out stages towards a final peace agreement in Mindanao.304 This plan that would bring 
them to sustainable peace was called the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro 
(FAB) and signed on October 15, 2012.305 
A. NEGOTIATION OF PEACE AGREEMENT 
The signing of the FAB in 2012 marked the first of many steps towards the 
creation of the peace agreement signed in 2014. The negotiations through March 2014 
produced the annexes to the CAB that defined Mindanao’s autonomy. Talks that centered 
on normalization, power sharing, and wealth sharing reopened in November 2012.306 
Like many of the previous rounds, these talks and the subsequent one concluded with no 
solution to the conflict.307 This round was extremely difficult since discussions dealt with 
bargaining for how much autonomy would be given to the Moros.308 Talks also stalled 
due to a disagreement concerning the Bangsamoro Transition Authority and which entity 
would spearhead the operation.309 Talks eventually progressed as President Aquino 
closed the year out by signing an order that established a committee charged with the 
responsibility of developing the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). 
The peace negotiation process found more productivity in 2013. In the first six 
months of 2013, the GOP and MILF established responsibilities of the Third-Party 
Monitoring Group, announced the Transition Commission roster, signed the Annex on 
Transitional Arrangements and Modalities (TAM), and constructed guidelines for the 
creation of an Independent Commission on Policing (ICP).310 The Third-Party 
Monitoring Team assumed responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the 
304 Morada, The Framework Agreement, 1. 
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finalized peace agreement. The Transition Commission assumed responsibility for the 
creation of a Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) that will govern the future Bangsamoro 
region. The Annex on Transitional Arrangements on Modalities (TAM) outlines the 
processes to be utilized as the ARMM transitions into its Bangsamoro identity.311 The 
annex further determined that the transition process will be spearheaded by the MILF.312 
The Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) will report observations that will aid in 
the determination of the Bangsamoro Police’s relationship with the Philippine National 
Police.313 The conditions of the ICP also allow for a team tasked to assist with the 
creation of its task organization.314 At the conclusion of the 35th through 37th rounds of 
peace talks, the GOP and MILF had made significant progress towards sustainable peace 
in Mindanao. 
Peace talks remained turbulent and encountered numerous stalemates; however, 
the second half of 2013 continued to incrementally bring progress towards a sustainable 
peace between the GOP and the MILF. Although these rounds faced plenty of 
disagreements, both groups continued to push forward towards formulating a solution. In 
this time, the GOP and MILF conducted the 38th through 42nd rounds of negotiations 
and completed the wealth sharing and power sharing annexes.315 The annex on wealth 
sharing signed in July 2013 will produce financial compensation and increase monetary 
shares from the region’s mineral industry for the Moros.316 Specifically, the Bangsamoro 
will collect 75% of all taxes collected from the region and 75% of all income from the 
metallic mineral industry.317 The wealth-sharing annex increases financial opportunities 
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for the Moro population. The annex on power sharing was signed in December 2013.318 
This annex outlines the limit of power that the GOP and the Bangsamoro government 
will have within the future Bangsamoro region.319  
The arrival of 2014 brought what many thought would never come. The start of 
the year brought a solution to the Bangsamoro waters issue and the signing of the 
normalization annex.320 The normalization annex that was signed in January 2014 directs 
the retirement of the MILF’s military unit and outlines the process of weapons 
withdrawal from the MILF and local militias in the future Bangsamoro political entity.321 
An addendum that was also completed announced the Bangsamoro region’s water 
boundaries.322 In February 2014, leaders from the Philippine Congress met with the 
Senate President and House Speaker and agreed to approve the BBL by the close of the 
year.323 Once the BBL finally receives approval from Congress, the CAB can begin its 
implementation process.324 On 27 March 2014, the GOP and the MILF signed the 
CAB.325 This historical signing may potentially close the door to 40 years of armed 
conflict and open the door to another chance at peace.326 
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B. IMPLEMENTATION  
Implementation of the CAB has been delayed. Before the agreement can be 
implemented, Congress must approve the BBL. The Special Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Bangsamoro created by the House of Representatives projected a 17 December 2014 
approval for the BBL that legalizes the autonomous arrangements.327 The House of 
Representatives continues to unilaterally extend the deadline; the deadline is now on its 
second extension.328 The first extension to February 2015 has now been further delayed 
to March 2015.329 After Congress approves the BBL and has been signed by the 
president, a plebiscite within the proposed Bangsamoro political entity will be 
conducted.330 Following the plebiscite and the delineation of boundaries within the 
proposed Bangsamoro region, elections in 2016 for the incoming government are 
planned. 
The Special Ad Hoc Committee on the Bangsamoro chair, Rufus Rodriguez, 
blamed delays with the BBL on issues like the disagreement against the Moros having its 
own police force not under the authority of the Philippine National Police 
Commission.331 Additionally, he adds that the recent Mamasapano Massacre that killed 
44 members of the Philippine National Police has assisted in delaying the timeline.332 
However, Rodriguez states that, once these changes are adjusted within the boundaries of 
the constitution, the BBL will be approved.333 
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C. THE CAB WILL NOT RESOLVE CONFLICT IN MINDANAO 
Some remain pessimistic about the CAB’s potential to achieve sustainable peace. 
As there are many reasons why the CAB will succeed, there are equally as many reasons 
why the CAB will fail. Reasons why some believe that the CAB will fail include: the 
exclusivity of the agreement and the inability to completely implement conditions of the 
agreement. 
Rita Linda V. Jimeno discusses the existence of an opinion by some that the CAB 
is destined to fail due to its exclusivity.334 The recently signed CAB was an agreement 
solely between the GOP and the MILF. Jimeno explains that the consensus believes that 
the CAB will fail since it does not include groups like the Lumads, the MNLF, and the 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Furthermore, the exclusivity of the agreement would likely 
increase conflict in Mindanao. Prior to the signing of the CAB, 2013 brought incidents of 
violence in the region by smaller armed groups like MNLF-Misuari Group (MNLF-MG) 
and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM).335 These groups are residents 
of the proposed Bangsamoro entity. The violent episodes that these groups were a part of 
clearly show that armed conflict still existed despite ongoing negotiations between the 
GOP and the MILF.336 Specifically, the BIFM disapproved of the peace negotiations and 
communicated their rejection of the peace agreement to the GOP through armed 
conflict.337 These incidents leave us to question whether the CAB is truly inclusive of all 
groups living in Mindanao. Exclusivity of an agreement has been a past point of failure in 
some of the previous peace agreements that have collapsed. While both signatories to the 
latest agreement have claimed that the CAB is inclusive of all groups living in Mindanao, 
the fact that the agreement was signed between only two parties may play a role in 
disturbing the potential for success of the agreement. 
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The GOP and the MILF’s inability to completely implement the CAB is another 
concern. Gus Miclat believes that “implementation of its provisions is the major 
hurdle.”338 Miclat hopes that those responsible for drafting the BBL truly capture the 
conditions that were developed between the GOP and the MILF.339 National Secretary of 
the United Youth for Peace and Development-Relief Assistance Network and 
Organization (UNYPAD-RANAO) Nasser Binasing provides that there are MILF leaders 
who are growing agitated in response to rumors that the GOP has been manipulating the 
basic law.340 Additionally, violent incidents involving other armed groups in Mindanao 
during the peace process showed that the GOP’s “strategy in the southern Philippines is 
focused on an agreement with the MILF” and “revealed the dangers of Manila’s failure to 
recognize and reward powerful local intermediaries in the Sulu Archipelago, including 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) Chairman Nur Misuari and Sakur Tan, the 
powerful governor of Sulu province.”341 Though it is still early to determine the BBL’s 
impact, the concern about whether the BBL will truly benefit the entire Bangsamoro 
region and not just the MILF still remains.342 If the CAB is not completely implemented 
as discussed at the signing, the probability of armed conflict in the region is more likely.  
Another potential obstacle to the implementation of the CAB is the plebiscite 
scheduled after the passing of the BBL. Following the BBL’s approval, “people living in 
areas to be included in the Bangsamoro will need to ratify the Bangsamoro Basic Law in 
a plebiscite to be held in 2015.”343 In past agreements, plebiscites conducted during past 
negotiations tend to weaken some of the conditions that were originally agreed upon. The 
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deviation from the original conditions typically angers one group and results in the re-
ignition of armed conflict. While some believe that the passing and implementation of the 
BBL is key to the agreement’s success, there are others who believe that there are other 
factors that would determine the CAB’s success. In a discussion on the CAB by Butch D. 
Enerio and Mario C. Manlupig, Jr., Mary Ann Arnado of the Mindanao People’s Caucus 
provides that the true test of the CAB will be during the plebiscite.344 This should be a 
major concern because if the plebiscite significantly alters the conditions that were 
originally agreed on, the agreement could face difficulties in getting completely 
implemented. This has been the case historically. The plebiscite is tentatively scheduled 
for some time in 2015; regardless of its results, both sides may benefit by remaining 
diligent in the agreements implementation. 
D. THE CAB WILL RESOLVE CONFLICT IN MINDANAO  
Despite those that believe the CAB is a failure in the making, there are those who 
perceive that the CAB will finally bring sustainable peace to Mindanao. Some predict 
that the CAB will be a success due to the inclusiveness of the agreement. Historically, the 
exclusiveness of past agreements has played a major factor in their collapse. Edwin 
Lacierda, a presidential spokesman from Malacanang Palace, claims that all residents of 
the future Bangsamoro entity will benefit from the agreement.345 Lacierda’s statement 
suggests that the agreement between the GOP and MILF will represent the best interests 
of all and is inclusive of all groups such as the indigenous Lumads, Christians, MILF, and 
MNLF.346 Lacierda further states that this agreement is an upgrade of the current 
agreement that governs the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and asks 
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for other groups to review the agreement for proof of its inclusivity.347 Iqbal, the MILF’s 
peace panel chair is in concurrence with Lacierda’s claim. Iqbal believes in the CAB and 
states that the agreement is not a solution for just the MILF, but a solution for all 
residents of the proposed Bangsamoro region regardless of affiliation.348 Evidence that 
the peace agreement might find success and a hint of inclusivity took form in a message 
from the MNLF. The MNLF, who originally believed that the CAB was a violation of 
their 1996 peace agreement, sent Reverend Absalom Cerveza to extend a congratulations 
to the GOP and MILF on behalf of Nur Misuari after the agreement’s signing.349 
This agreement also differs from previous agreements due to its inclusion of the 
international community. Though the future can never be easily predicted, Professor 
Mohagher Iqbal provides, from his perspective as the MILF’s chief negotiator, that the 
positive points of the agreement outweigh the negative and that the global community 
can greatly assist in ensuring success of the agreement.350 Like Iqbal, Selcuk Colakoglu 
awards the international community with the credit of the agreement’s success due to 
their “constructive assistance and participation” during the peace talks.351 Iqbal states 
that the outcome for success is bright and highly probable due to the actions shown 
during negotiations by the government of the Philippines.352 Iqbal concludes that the 
agreement is close to resolution due to the lessons learned from past agreement 
attempts.353 Based on Colakoglu and Iqbal’s assessment, the autonomous conditions 
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crafted in conjunction with GOP backing and international support will secure 
sustainable peace. 
Though the implementation process has been delayed, observers like Jules 
Maaten argue that the agreement will be completely implemented. Project Director of the 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Jules Maaten, states that the CAB is promising in its 
quest for resolution due to conditions that include the implementation of a Moro basic 
law.354  Both sides must ensure that the CAB is completely implemented in order to 
guarantee the best chances for peace in the region.  
E. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, success or failure of the CAB depends on Congress passing the 
BBL. Some people believe that the exclusivity of the agreement and the likelihood that 
the GOP and MILF will not completely implement the agreement will be the major 
reasons that contribute to the failure of the agreement. On the other hand, others believe 
that the agreement is inclusive and that (because it addresses all issues) it will promote an 
environment that ensures all conditions are completely implemented. While the future is 
still unclear and the country prepares for a new president in 2016, the CAB is indeed 
promising in its potential to reach sustainable peace.  
 
  
354 Friedrich Naumann Regional Office for Southeast and East Asia, “Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation,” accessed July 23, 2014, http://www.fnfasia.org/the-bangsamoro-peace-agreement-a-historic-
breakthrough/. 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
The 2014 signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is 
the latest effort between the Government of the Philippines (GOP) and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) to resolve the long and drawn out conflict in Mindanao. Studies 
of past agreements that collapsed suggest that an inability to fully implement conditions 
of those agreements and the exclusion of important groups from the negotiations leading 
up to those agreements, have been the main reasons why previous attempts have failed. 
Using the themes of implementation and exclusivity, this section briefly discusses the 
similarities and differences between the CAB and previous agreements, makes a final 
conclusion on the CAB’s likelihood of resolving conflict, and addresses future factors 
that could potentially steer Mindanao toward instability. 
A. 1976 TRIPOLI AGREEMENT 
Incomplete implementation of the agreement by the GOP was responsible for the 
failure of the Tripoli Agreement. Exclusivity was not an issue with this agreement, since 
it involved all major Moro actors at the time. President Ferdinand Marcos’ deviation from 
the original agreement was evidence that the GOP did not want to resolve conflict.355 
Rather than moving forward with the conditions discussed, the GOP implemented a 
surprise plebiscite referendum that turned one autonomous region into two separate 
autonomous regions.356 Due to disagreement on the interpretation of the agreement and 




355 Majul, The Moro Struggle, 909. 
356 Ibid., 908. 
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B. 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT 
This study attributes the collapse of the Final Peace Agreement to the following 
two reasons: the Moro National Liberation Front’s (MNLF) inability to fully implement 
the agreement and the exclusivity of the agreement. Corruption by MNLF members 
holding top government positions in Mindanao prevented the agreement from being fully 
implemented.357 Additionally, exclusion of groups like the MILF generated disgruntled 
parties in the region.358 The failure to include these groups into the negotiation process 
left unresolved land issues between the Christians and Moros and halted the progress of 
stability in the region.359 Due to these reasons, the Final Peace Agreement collapsed. 
C. 2008 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN  
This study points to the exclusivity of the agreement as the main reason for the 
collapse of the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The 
exclusivity of the agreement resulted in protests from marginalized groups.360 Christian 
politicians eventually submitted a petition to the Supreme Court that would declare the 
agreement unconstitutional.361 Failure to include such groups ultimately led to the 
downfall of the MOA-AD. 
D. 2014 COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO 
President Benigno Aquino III and his administration have made tremendous 
efforts to restore peace in the Mindanao. The GOP’s desire to fully implement the 
agreement has been evident throughout the process. However, after the signing of the 
CAB in March 2014, the first deadline to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) by 
December 17, 2014 was missed.362 The deadline to approve the BBL was subsequently 
357 May, Obstacles to Conflict Resolution, 284–285. 
358 De Castro, Weakness and Gambits, 703. 
359 Bertrand, Peace and Conflict, 51. 
360 Hurights Osaka, Mindanao Conflict. 
361 Lum, The Republic of the Philippines, 20. 
362 Arguillas, Dec 17 is Target Date. 
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changed to March 2015 by the House of Representatives.363 While the missed milestone 
is a different circumstance than the ones responsible for the collapse of the Tripoli 
Agreement, it could still potentially trigger a pattern of future missed deadlines that might 
instigate conflict in the region.  
The MILF and the GOP have been deeply invested into the process of finding a 
solution to the conflict in Mindanao. Though the GOP and the MILF are the only signing 
parties, the GOP claims that the agreement is inclusive of all residents living in 
Mindanao.364 The MNLF has been on record congratulating both parties on the signing 
of the CAB.365 Based on this information and relevant studies, the CAB appears to have 
addressed points of failure that contributed to the collapse of the 1996 Final Peace 
Agreement. Currently, the GOP and MILF awaits for Congress to approve the BBL. The 
exclusion of Congress from the negotiation process has resulted in significant delays. If 
Congress continues to extend the BBL deadline, then the potential for the MILF to return 
to violence may be likely. A return to violence by the MILF will likely hurt the chances 
of the CAB being implemented; however, if Congress meets the BBL deadline then it is 
probable that the CAB will resolve conflict in Mindanao. 
The current agreement fully addresses the main reason that led to the failure of the 
2008 MOA-AD. The GOP has been adamant about the inclusivity of the CAB.366 The 
MILF also concurs about the CAB’s inclusivity.367 If the agreement is truly inclusive, 
then the chance for the re-emergence of violence from other non-signing parties may be 
unlikely. Though the incumbent administration have been very supportive during the 
process, the 2014 CAB will still be subjected to a plebiscite referendum in Mindanao.368 
The process of removing the requirement for a plebiscite referendum is unlikely since it 
will require extensive legislation to do so. As previously stated, results from past 
363 Patricio P. Diaz, “Another Extension Puzzles,” Mindanews, December 18, 2014, 
http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2014/12/18/comment-another-extension-puzzles/. 
364 Asian Journal, Filipinos Should Read. 
365 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, GPH MILF Negotiators. 
366 Asian Journal, Filipinos Should Read. 
367 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, GPH MILF Chief Negotiators. 
368 Office of the President of the Philippines, Give Peace. 
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plebiscite referendums have led to the collapse of previous peace agreements. If the 
forthcoming plebiscite referendum produces results inconsistent with the original 
conditions settled upon during the signing, there is a likelihood that violence in the region 
will continue. If the results parallel the original conditions, then the chance that the CAB 
will resolve conflict in Mindanao is highly probable. 
E. LIKELIHOOD OF THE CAB RESOLVING CONFLICT  
This study has determined that the two leading reasons for the failure of the 1976 
Tripoli Agreement, 1996 Final Peace Agreement, and the 2008 MOA-AD are the 
exclusion of one or more important groups from the negotiations and one group’s failure 
to fully implement the conditions of the agreement. But in the last few years, both the 
GOP and the MILF have been working hard to create sustainable peace in Mindanao. 
Though both signatory groups’ claim that the CAB is inclusive and will be fully 
implemented, the fact remains that a plebiscite referendum is scheduled to be conducted. 
Though results and effects from past plebiscite referendums have been historically 
disappointing, this is not a determinant of what results will be produced from the 
forthcoming plebiscite referendum. Additionally, the deadline for the passage of the BBL 
has already been extended. The GOP and MILF may remain positive during the 
implementation phase as they were during the CAB’s drafting. Should both groups do so, 
the conflict may be resolved. To this point, the CAB shows plenty of promise. If the 
agreement is truly inclusive as both parties claim, then we can expect key grievances to 
eventually be addressed and resolved. If this pattern of movement continues, then a minor 
deviation from the implementation timeline should have little to no effect. Based on these 
reasons, this study predicts that the CAB will resolve conflict in Mindanao. 
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